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As in most OECD countries, the business services industry in the Netherlands has 
grown  much  faster  than  the  market  sector  as  a  whole.  It  has,  however,  displayed 
stagnating productivity growth, in some periods even a fall in productivity. Does this 
fast-growing  industry  with  a  bad  productivity  record  present  a  threat  to  aggregate 
productivity  growth  and,  hence,  to  future  economic  growth?  Reviewing  existing 
empirical evidence, the paper argues that this concern need not be valid. The business 
services  industry  has  an  important  role  in  the  national  innovation  system  and  in 
knowledge  spillovers  to  other  industries.  The  innovation  contribution  of  business 
services to the rest of the economy may countervail the effect of its own stagnating 
productivity growth. Moreover, the industry has not yet exhausted opportunities for 
tackling existing X-inefficiencies. The paper further sketches some policy options for 
improving the productivity record of business services, and for strengthening its role in 
knowledge spillovers to client industries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The business services industry in OECD countries grew much faster than the market 
sector as a whole. In all countries, business services have been a job-creating machine. 
Apart from its dynamism, the industry is widely regarded as strategic because of its 
contribution to the modern knowledge economy. The flip side of the coin is that the 
business services industry itself had an almost stagnating productivity growth which 
might  become  a  burden  for  economic  growth, especially  in  view of the  industry’s 
increasing weight within the total economy. 
  This paper considers the macro-economic productivity contribution of business 
services  in  more  detail.  The  central  research  question  is  whether  knowledge  and 
productivity  spillovers  generated  by  the  business  services  industry  countervail  the 
increasing  effect  of  its  own  weak  productivity  growth.  The  paper  ends  with  some 
policy options. The main focus is on the business services industry in the Netherlands, 
but its development will sometimes be put in an international perspective. Throughout 




The macroeconomic productivity contribution of the BS industry will be discussed 
against the background of the unbalanced-growth model developed by Baumol (1967) 
and  Baumol  et  al.  (1989).  The  latter  analysed  how  an  expanding  low-productivity 
services sector may bring down the growth rate of the entire economy, a pattern that is 
nowadays known as “Baumol disease”. The services sector in his growth model has 
only  a limited  potential for labour-saving  and  productivity  growth.  Moreover,  it  is 
characterised by a relatively price-inelastic demand. Its wages follow those of the most 
productive sector. In this economy, an increasing share of labour will be employed by 
the services sector. The imminent ‘disease’ is that the growth rate of the economy falls, 
while the relative price of services rises. Fase and Winder (1995) found evidence for 
the presence of 'Baumol disease' phenomena in the Netherlands. 
  Stylised facts on the growth pattern of the Dutch BS industry indeed provide 
some  ground  for  the  suspicion  that  this  industry's  performance  contributes  to  the 
advent of Baumol’s disease: 
 
1.  Employment  growth.  While  representing  about  10%  of  total  market  sector 
employment  in  1990,  the  BS  industry  contributed  no  less  than  54 per  cent  of 
market sector employment growth between 1990 and 2002.
1  
2.  Low  price  elasticity  of  demand:  demand  growth  was  strong  despite  an 
increasing relative price of BS vis-à-vis the market sector. 
3.  Converging wage rate increases. The BS industry closely follows the wage 
increases of the most productive industries (Fase en Winder 1995; Van der Wiel 1999; 
Rubiera 2003; Lowe 1995). 
 
1 If temporary employment agencies are left out, the contribution becomes 35 per cent.   3 












Figure  2    Productivity  growth  gap:  difference  between  labour  productivity 




Notes: Productivity is measured per hour worked. For Germany the period average refers to 1992-1999. 
For Italy the second period refers to 1993-2000. In the Netherlands, BS industry data do not include 
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4.  Productivity  growth.  Over  the  1980s,  Dutch  BS  productivity  growth  was 
negative, about zero in the first half of the 1990s, and improving to 0.9% annually over 
the period 1996-2000 (Figure 1). With such a poor productivity record, the BS industry 
lagged significantly behind the rest of the market sector (Figure 2). What is positive, 
however, is the fact that the productivity gap in the Netherlands is shrinking over time. 
Both  graphs  also  show  that  the  patterns  are  not  typically  Dutch.  The  productivity 
performance of the BS industry in most other countries is even worse.  
Using  growth  decomposition,  we  can  look  inside  the  black  box  of  BS 
productivity. The productivity growth of the BS industry as a whole during recent 
years  stems  completely  from  two  sub-sectors:  computer  services  and  legal, 
accountancy and economic consultancy. Table 1 indicates that all other sub-sectors - 
also  knowledge-intensive  sub-sectors  such  as  contract  R&D  or  engineering 
consultancy - contributed negatively to BS productivity growth.
2  
 
Table 1  Sub-sector decomposition of productivity change in Dutch BS industry, 1995-2001 
Sub-sector  Productivity 
change by sub-
sector 
Change in sub-sector 
share 
Total contribution by 
sub-sector to BS 
productivity growth 
a 
 Sub-sector share in 
total BS 
employment, 2001 
         
   %-point contribution to annual productivity change  % share    










Computer services  0.13  0.18  0.39  19.1 
Industrial cleaning  -0.03  0.11  0.07  12.7 
Engineering, architectural services  -0.12  0.00  -0.12  14.2 
Marketing services  -0.05  0.00  -0.05  5.8 
Contract R&D  -0.07  -0.05  -0.11  4.5 
Other BS sub-sectors  -0.07  0.01  -0.05  11.9 
         
Total 
b  0.13  0.20  0.42  100 
Notes: a) The total contribution includes second-order effects (composite effect of changes in productivity 
and  changes  in  sub-sector  shares.  b)  Excluding  the  equipment  rental  sub-sector  and  temporary  work 
agencies. Data sources: CBS input-output tables and CPB database. 
 
A superficial diagnosis on the basis of the stylised facts presented could conclude that  
the growth of the BS industry must have reduced Dutch economic growth in a way 
comparable to the Baumol disease. Yet, this conjecture is not justified. There are three 
reasons  why  further  growth  of  the  BS  industry  does  not  necessarily  contribute  to 
stagnation of macro-economic growth. They will subsequently be elaborated upon. The 
main point that is overlooked is that the Baumol model focussed on consumer services, 
whereas  business  services  are  intermediary  inputs  for  other  industries.  The  second 
point is that the BS industry indirectly raises the productivity of other industries by the 
knowledge  spillovers  it  generates.  Finally,  in  contrast  to  the  service  sector  in  the 
Baumol model, the BS industry might have an unexhausted potential for labour-saving 
and productivity improvements.  
 
 
2 In the case of industrial cleaning this effect was compensated by its decreasing share in BS industry, thus 
allowing the average productivity of BS as a whole to increase.   5 
BS INDUSTRY AS A PROVIDER OF INTERMEDIARY INPUTS 
 
Several  studies  have  shown  that  even  low-productive  intermediate  industries  may 
increase macro-economic productivity growth (Fixler and Siegel 1999; Oulton 2001). 
For this to occur, it is only necessary that the intermediary inputs replace primary 
labour inputs in the client industries.
3 This is exactly what has happened, for cost-
saving reasons, in the outsourcing movement that swept across all market industries 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Privatisation of government services had the same 
effect. There have been two outsourcing waves. The first one, running from the 1980s 
into the early 1990s, was characterised mainly by the outsourcing of relatively simple 
internal labour services to outside firms. BS branches with standardised services like 
industrial cleaning, catering and security benefited most from the early outsourcing 
tendency. The BS industry thus accounts for an increasing share of total intermediary 
input  use.  Table 1  indicates  that  the  remarkably  strong  growth  of  the  Dutch  BS 
industry may at least partly be due to a catch-up growth process vis-à-vis other OECD 
countries. Essential in the first outsourcing wave was that business services rendered 
 
Table 1  Use of business services as intermediary inputs in market industries, 1990-1998 d) 
Country  1990       1998      
     
  Value of BS inputs as percentage of gross output 
a    
     
Netherlands  4.8        8.6       
United Kingdom  7.5        9,3       
USA  7,2        6,3 
b      
France  7,8        7,5 
c    
Notes:  a) measured in current prices, implying that inter-period growth rates must be interpreted with 
some caution. b) 1997. c) 1995. d) For a further breakdown by BS-using industry, see Kox (2002: 84-86). 
Sources: calculated from input-output tables from OECD database and Statistics Netherlands.  
to the client firms were more akin to (and, hence, a substitute for) direct labour inputs 
into  the  client’s  production  process  than  to  material  intermediate  deliveries.
4  The 
second outsourcing wave, starting in the early 1990s in the Netherlands, makes the 
relation  between  BS  inputs  and  the  client’s  production  process  more  complex.  It 
entailed a shift towards knowledge-intensive BS products that were often tailor-made 
for particular clients. Often this represented quality improvement, specialisation and 
innovation,  rather  than  pure  replacement  of  internal  services.  The  BS  branches 
benefiting most from the second outsourcing wave were IT development, engineering, 
legal  services,  management  consultancy,  industrial  design,  marketing,  and  even 
commercial R&D. Since 1995, these knowledge-intensive sub-sectors accounted for 
most  of  the  growth  of  the  BS  industry.  Many  of  their  services  changed  the  very 
production  process  of  the  client  firms,  rather  than  representing  mere  labour 
substitution. 
 
3 As Oulton (2001) shows this may increase overall productivity growth, provided that the business 
services industry itself has a positive productivity growth rate. Furthermore, an important but implicit 
assumption in his model is that competition in the markets for BS products is such that all labour 
productivity gains (no matter how small) are fully passed on to its clients. It will be argued later on in this 
paper that  this full-competition criterion may not be satisfied in many BS markets.   
4  Cf.  Egger, Pfaffermayr and Weber (2003)   6 
 
DO  MEASUREMENT  PROBLEMS  IN  BS  INDUSTRY  AFFECT  MACRO-
ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY? 
 
A brief side-step to the potential impacts of productivity measurement problems in the 
BS industry is warranted at this juncture in the argument. The high degree of product 
differentiation and the increasing knowledge intensity of the products beg the question 
whether  real  output  of  the  industry  is  measured  appropriately.  Although  European 
statistical offices are working out methods for improving the registration of services 
activities, there is still a long way to go. Now suppose that product differentiation and 
the degree of knowledge intensity indeed causes an underestimation of BS output. How 
would this affect BS productivity, and the BS contribution to aggregate productivity 
growth? Some observations can be made without even knowing the empirical details. 
To this end, Table 2 presents a simplified input-output framework for the BS industry 
and  two  other  industries  (Ind_1,Ind_2)  with  fictive  numbers.  It  is  assumed  that 
intermediate BS deliveries are underestimated by factor a and BS deliveries to final 
demand by factor b. The shaded part in the table reflects net production or value added, 
the basis for measuring aggregate productivity.  
 
Table 2  A fictive input-output table in which BS output is underestimated 
        
Intermediate deliveries to: 
  Ind_1      Ind_2       BS industry     
    
Total        
 
 
Final        
demand     
  
 
Gross       
production       
Deliveries by Ind_1  10          5           1                 16            16          32                
Deliveries by Ind_2   4          2           2                   8           10          18                
Deliveries by BS industry   7 + a1  3 + a2   10 + a3           20 + Σa      3 + b    23 + b + Σa  




21 + a1 
 
10 + a2  
 
13 + a3           
 
44 + Σa   
   
             
Value added (= net production)  11- a1     8 - a2   10 + b + a1+ a2  29 + b            
Gross production  32          18          23 + b + Σa       
  
73 + b + Σa        
 
 
This simple static framework allows allows three conclusions regarding the possible 
effects of any errors in the measurement of BS output. First, the measurement error 
may cause an underestimation of gross output for the BS industry and for the total 
economy. Secondly, the aggregate economy's net production is only underestimated to 
the extent that BS deliveries to final demand are underestimated. The measurement 
errors  in  intermediate  deliveries  cancel  out  each  other,  and  have  no  impact  on 
aggregate net production. Thirdly, measurement errors in intermediate BS deliveries do 
have an impact on the productivity of individual industries. Productivity of the BS 
industry will improve, while the productivity of other industries will be lowered.    7 
The upshot is that only an underestimation of BS deliveries to final demand could 
matter  for  aggregate  productivity  growth.
5  Empirical  estimates  on  the  impact  of 
measurement errors in other OECD countries indicate that a slight underestimation of 
aggregate productivity could occur.
 6 In relation to the Baumol disease discussion, it is 
important to note that the BS industry's contribution to aggregate productivity growth 
may well be larger - and the contribution by other industries smaller - than measured 
at present. 




KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS BY BS INDUSTRY 
 
Knowledge-intensive BS firms have achieved an important role in national innovation 
systems; they contribute in three ways to modern knowledge infrastructure: 
 
  Original  innovations.  Firms  in  the  sub-sectors  software,  engineering  and 
contract research actively contribute to technological innovations. These BS branches 
account  for  a  large  part  of  the  above-average  R&D  effort  of  the  Dutch  services 
industry, shown in Figure 4. They also account for the majority of the national patent 
registrations that originate from services industries (European Commission 2003; Blind 
et al. 2003). Firms in other BS branches are active innovators in non-technological 
 
5 In 2002, 21% of BS industry's gross production went to domestic final demand (mainly investment), and 
17% to exports.  
6 Wölfl (2003) surveys recent studies on the potential macroeconomic impact of the measurement bias in 
the entire services industry. The surveyed empirical studies all have a speculative nature (‘what if.. ?’).   8 
areas such as organisational development, firm strategy, human resource management, 
PR or marketing. (Boden and Miles 2000; Rubalcaba 1999). Many of the basic BS 
innovations  are  adapted  for  client  firms  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  The  Community 
Innovation Survey for the Netherlands shows that the share of innovating firms in 
computer services and engineering and architectural services is equal or higher than in 
manufacturing industry, even though their innovation expenditure is relatively lower 
(CBS 2001). 
  Knowledge  diffusion.  Service  providers  in  several  BS  branches  are  in  the 
unique position of being able to look into the ‘knowledge kitchen’ of client firms. They 
observe localised, tacit knowledge solutions in client firms. But since their horizon is 
wider, they can more easily conceptualise such solutions and select ‘best practice’ 
solutions  to  more  common  business  problems.  Such  ‘best  practice’  information  is 
subsequently introduced as input when they serve new clients. With regard to many 
competence  areas,  BS  providers  thus  lead  client  firms  to  the  relevant  efficiency 
frontier. As a source of external information for innovating Dutch companies, BS firms 
rank before universities (Figure 5). Similar patterns were found in Finland (Leiponen 
2001) and the United Kingdom (Hughes and Wood 1999).  
 
Figure 5  Share of innovating firms that co-operates with BS providers and other 
information sources outside the own industry, Netherlands 1996-1998 
Note: Both contract research institutes (NACE 73) and consultants (NACE 72,74) form part of BS industry. Sources: 
CBS (2001), Klomp and Meinen (2001). 
 
 
  Surpassing human capital indivisibilities. The supply of knowledge-intensive 
business services reduces firm-specific economies of scale with regard to knowledge 
and human capital inputs. Even small client firms nowadays have access to specialist   9 
knowledge and specialist skills that once were the domain of universities and large 
firms. 
  We may wrap up the argument so far. The poor productivity growth figures for 
BS industry do not reflect this industry's full contribution to aggregate productivity 
growth.  The  BS industry also  generates positive  indirect productivity  effects  in  its 
client industries. In the literature on spillover effects between industries, a distinction is 
made  between  knowledge  spillovers  and  rent  spillovers  (e.g.  Griliches  1979).  The 
former relates to knowledge flows between industries, while the latter relates to under-
priced quality improvements in intermediate inputs.
7 In both cases, the price charged  
 
Table 3  Empirical studies on the impacts of BS industry and BS use  to productivity change and growth 
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Calculate production elasticities for BS 
use in production functions for a large 
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use 
Effect of BS use on value added of 
client industries: a 1% increase in BS 
inputs caused value added to increase 




Growth decomposition in input-output 
framework: tracing key sectors that 
generated cost savings and product 
improvements (measured by R&D 







BS industry key sector for productivity 
growth during 1980s, causing large 
labour saving in other industries. BS 
also important player in the forward 
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Software industry contributed 0.1% to 
the 1.6% productivity growth 
acceleration after 1995.  
Pilat & Lee 
(2001) 
Decomposition aggregate labour 












(a) Computer services contributed 
positively in Denmark, Germany and 
Italy, but negatively in Netherlands and 
Finland. (b) other BS inputs 
contributed negatively except in 
Denmark (period 1995-1999)  
b 
Van Leeuwen 
& Van der 
Wiel (2003) 
Combination of growth accounting and 
enhanced production function models 









Contribution of ICT spillovers to 
productivity growth was very strong, 
and even more so in innovating firms 
 
Note: a) "Whilst the high-technology manufacturing undertakers of R&D are also the major feeders for other sectors, the interesting 
feature is the rise of the BS sector which by 1990 had become a major 'supplier' of R&D although itself only a small R&D spender" 




7 Under-pricing of products in the case of rent spillovers is the result of an intentional process governed by 
market circumstances. It differs therefore from the statistical problem of how to measure BS services 
appropriately.   10 
for inputs is lower than the contribution of these services to value creation in client 
industries. Now, if the BS industry is indeed the source of such spillovers, this must 
show up in empirical studies of industrial productivity. Some studies cover BS inputs 
in general, but most spillover studies focus more specifically on the contributions of 
R&D  and  information  technology.  Table 3  gives  a  brief  survey  of  some  studies.
8 
Though the empirical evidence is incomplete and fragmentary, we may conclude that 
positive spillover effects from the BS sub-sector computer services have been quite 
strong.  Other  studies  show  positive  spillover  effects  from  BS  inputs  without 
differentiating their sub-sector origin. These results seem to imply that BS firms have 
been unable (or unwilling) to charge prices that reflect the full contribution of their 
services to value creation in client industries.   
  When the productivity spillovers originating from BS industry keep growing 
along with the size of this industry, this might well be sufficient to outweigh the effect 
of  its  own  poor  productivity  growth.  The  indirect  productivity  effects  provide  a 
counterbalance to the Baumol disease tendency. But there is more. 
 
STAGNATING  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH  IN  BUSINESS  SERVICES  NO 
FAIT ACCOMPLI 
 
Notwithstanding  their  labour-intensity,  some  service  industries  accomplished  fairly 
high  productivity  increases  (OECD  2003).  Also,  the  BS  industry  may  have 
unexhausted opportunities for productivity increase. Some causes of X-inefficiencies 
still remain to be tackled: lack of market transparency (e.g. Fase and Winder 1995), 
diseconomies of small firm size, and modest process innovation effort within BS firms. 
These problems will be discussed subsequently:  
  (A)  Lack  of  market  transparency  and  weak  competition  lower  efficiency 
pressure.  Competition  intensity  and  market  transparency  increase  the  pressure  on 
margins, and the pressure to remove X-inefficiencies. Conversely, weak competition 
and  opaque  markets  have  an  adverse  effect  on  average  cost  efficiency.  The  latter 
condition applies in large parts of the markets for knowledge-intensive BS. Product 
differentiation, up even to the level of client-specific products, reduces comparability 
of products and prices. Competition in markets for knowledge-intensive services is 
dampened by the occurrence of switching costs (invested time, information) on the side 
of the clients.  
  Asymmetrical  information  problems  further  constricts  transparency  in  these 
markets. The products are experience goods or credence goods, i.e. buyers often lack 
quality information before and even shortly after purchasing the service. Buyers solve 
this quality information problem by navigating strongly on the basis of vested market 
reputations (Table 4).  
 
 
8 Other relevant studies are Hempel (2002), Collechia (2001), Tomlinson (2000, Müller and Zenker 
(2000).   11 
Table 4  How clients select a business service provider, survey data, EU 2000 
Selection criteria  Percentage of BS-purchasing firms stating “This 
selection criterion is very important” a) 
   
1. Quality of service being offered  79.3      
2. Expertise of the service provider  61.1    
3. Confidence in the capacity of the service provider to deliver  57.6    
4. Quality standards applied by the provider  47.5    
5. Price of services being offered  45.4    
6. Local presence of the service provider  17.1    
Note: a) The survey did not distinguish between standardised and client-specific services. It was held 
among  198  BS-using  firms  throughout  the  EU.  Small  BS-users  were  underrepresented  in  the  survey 
sample Source: CSES (2001: 148-150). 
 
Firms that provided a good product yesterday are expected to do the same tomorrow. 
Service firms with prestigious and large customers are easily taken to be high-quality 
providers. The importance  of  vested quality reputations renders a strong hysteresis 
element to the market structure. Market reputations differ by type of client and by 
geographical area (Table 5). Most small BS firms just have local reputations with a 
small network of clients. The reputation mechanism leads to a system of segmented 
markets  in  which  different  prices  and  tariffs  co-exist.  Competition  among  market 
segments on the basis of price and cost levels plays a subordinate role. 
 
Table 5  Typical pattern of market segmentation in BS industry 
  Company segments 
  Small non-
specialists 
Small and medium-sized 
specialist firms 
Medium and large 
national firms 
Subsidiaries of large 
transnational firms 
         
Geographic scope of 
market reputation 
Local, regional  International  National  International 
         
Main competitors  Local, small and 
medium-sized 
International specialists, 




large national firms 
         




Medium-sized to large firms  Medium-sized to large 
firms 
Large firms, often 
transnationals 
         
Source: Kox (2002) 
 
Note that in Table 4 the price criterion comes only in fifth place. Small entrants in 
general do not compete with the large firms in other market segments; they often find it 
difficult  to  outgrow  their  'typical'  market  segments.  Monopolistic  competition  is 
ubiquitous,  especially  in  knowledge-intensive  business  services,  due  to  the 
combination of market segmentation and product differentiation. On top of that, most 
sub-sectors have a small top segment in which a handful of multinational players—
meeting each other in several national markets—interact as oligopolists. Many of their 
client firms are also multinationals. If foreign service providers compete with domestic 
firms, their main domestic challengers are large nationally oriented service providers. 
The latter operate in the most competitive market segment with competition coming   12 
from  middle-sized  companies,  multinational  companies,  and  sometimes  even  from 
small international specialists (cf. CSES 2001; Kox 2002).  
 
  (B)  Sub-optimal firm size reduces productivity levels. Our research established 
that scale effects in the BS industry are quite strong. On the basis of microdata for 
Dutch BS firms we identified the optimal firm size from a productivity perspective. To 
get a first picture of the relation between productivity and firm size, Figure 6 shows 
average productivity per worker in different size classes of BS firms. A distinction is 
made  between  BS  branches  with  a  high  degree  of  product  differentiation  (client-
specific services) and those with more standardised products.
 9 The results indicate that 
the most productive scale size in client-specific BS is between 20 to 50 employees, 
while the most productive firm size in the standardised BS branches is somewhere 
between 100 to 200 employees. The results are confirmed and proven robust in detailed 
production function analysis at the lowest possible industry aggregation levels.
10  Since 
actual average firm size in the BS industry is much smaller than the most productive 
scale size, these results strongly suggest that a considerable labour productivity growth 
can be attained if average firm size in the BS industry would increase.  
  Now, how can this finding be reconciled with the actual firm size distribution? 
The BS industry is overwhelmingly a small firms industry. Only 6.6.% of all 105,000 
Dutch BS firms in 2000 had more than ten employees.
11 Almost 60% of the firms were 
self-employed entrepreneurs. In other OECD countries, a similar picture is found. Why 
do not firms themselves exploit the potential scale economies? One explanation can be 
found in the influx of many small-scale entrants, such as self-employed consultants. 
The BS industry counts among the industries with the highest entry rates for new firms, 
and the share of small firms in the company population is increasing. Since some 
knowledge-intensive BS sub-sectors are quite 'young', life cycle effects may play a 
role.  Entry  in  this  industry  hardly  faces  any  barriers  with  regard  to  fixed-capital 
investment.  Also  the  market  condition  plays  a  role  here;  the  very  strong  market 
demand for business services created a situation of excess demand in the 1990s, in 
which  competitive  pressure  was  mild  and  not  very  selective  for  new  entrants. 
Daalmans (2003) and Van der Wiel (1999) assessed that new BS entrants on average 
had a lower productivity level than incumbents, and that it took five to seven years for 
them to reach the average incumbent's productivity level. Massive entry numbers thus 
aggravated rather than alleviated this industry’s productivity growth problem.  
 
9 This pattern persists when productivity is measured as gross value added per full-time labour equivalent.  
10 We estimated translog production functions for 25 sub-sectors at a 5-digit level, for a total of 5700 BS 
firms, and  applied the Ray method for determining the most productive scale size. The results confirm the 
earlier results on the basis of descriptive statistics.  Finally, additional research shows that similar scale 
effects on productivity can be found in Sweden, France, Belgium and Italy, using New Cronos micro data 
for (Kox, Van Leeuwen and Van der Wiel 2003). 
11 Data: Statistics Netherlands, Statline.   13 

















Notes: Productivity  levels  are  measured  as  turnover  per  employee.  The  subsets  of  client-specific  and 
standardised services firms are distinguished on the basis of the average degree of product differentiation 
per 5-digit sub-sector. Data source: firm census data (CEREM, Statistics Netherlands). 
 
 
A further reason for the high incidence of small firms in the BS industry relates to the 
nature of the competition process in BS markets. Once having entered the market, it is 
not easy to grow beyond a micro firm size. The pervasiveness of market segmentation 
(see above) creates a growth hurdle for small and innovative firms that have not yet 
built up a market reputation.  
  In the markets for knowledge-intensive business services, a firm’s reputation 
and client goodwill is bound up with the perceived quality of its knowledge assets. But 
who  controls  these  knowledge  assets,  and  who  appropriates  their  rents?    In 
manufacturing industry, market reputations are often based on firm-owned and law-
protected  intangible  assets  (patents,  copyrights,  brands,  trademarks  and  design 
licenses). For the BS industry, especially for firms in knowledge-intensive services, the 
situation  is  different.  A  larger  part  of  reputation  assets  is  embodied  in  the  firm’s 
employees, particularly those employees that form the ‘face’ of the company for the 
clients. These so-called key employees carry and ‘own’ tacit knowledge and intangible 
competences, taking the latter home at the end of each working day (Zambon et al. 
2003). Since the mobility of this type of employee is rather high, conflicts between 
service company and service employee regarding claims to intellectual property are 
likely (e.g. Blind et al. 2003). The relevant knowledge assets and expertise are often 
client-specific rather than generic in branches like accountancy, software design and   14 
maintenance, legal services, management consultancy, and engineering services.
12 Job 
activities are implemented at the client’s premises rather than at the ‘home’ office. Key 
employees often have considerable discretionary decision power about the way they do 
their jobs. Marginal output increments from their work may be observable only after 
considerable time lags, if at all. They work under incomplete or inefficient monitoring, 
and under incomplete contracts. Job complexity and the incidence of contingencies 
make it virtually impossible for firm owners to write water-tight contracts sealing off 
all  future  contingencies  (e.g.  Foss  1999).  For  the  owner  of  the  services  firm,  key 
employees therefore are often monopolist providers of unique labour services. They 
cannot easily be substituted by other employees, for on-the-job training takes time and 
money, while changing a familiar face may cost client goodwill. There is always the 
risk that the key employee quits and starts a business on his own account. Often firm 
owners in knowledge-intensive BS industries hardly have a choice but to allow the key 
employees a share in the rents of the reputation assets. On the basis of their strong 
intra-company bargaining position, key employees may squeeze out part of the service 
firm’s residual profit income in the form of above-average salaries and fringe benefits. 
For small entrepreneurs, the bargaining position of key employees may form a growth 
disincentive that outweighs the ‘technical’ scale advantage associated with increased 
internal  division  of  labour  if  market  competition  is  not  too  strong.  Hence,  the 
importance of employee-held reputation assets in knowledge-intensive BS sub-sectors 
may at least partly explain the prevailing firm-size distribution and the failure of most 
firms to reach the most-productive firm size.  
  (C)  Modest  process  innovation  effort  inside  the  BS  firms.  While  the  BS 
industry has an important role in the innovation process of its clients, there is little 
indication that it is also innovative with regard to efficiency measures for its own 
production  process.  Dutch  firm-level  data  showed  that  intra-firm  innovation  has  a 
positive  effect  on  labour  productivity  growth  of  BS  firms  (Van  der  Wiel  2001). 
Especially  the  introduction  of  non-technological  innovations  appeared  to  have  a 
prodigious  impact  on  a  firm’s  labour  productivity  growth.  From  the  Community 
Innovation  Surveys  (CIS)  it  emerges  that  an  important  part  of  BS  firms  did  not 
introduce any internal process innovations. CIS results took stock of several factors 
that may keep firms back from doing more process innovation and eradicate internal 
X-inefficiencies:  risk  aspects,  financing  constraints,  and  internal  resistance.
13  A 
shortfall  in  internal  innovation  effort  may  imply  that  BS  providers  fail  to  grasp 
opportunities to strengthen their own productivity.  
  So far, three factors have been identified that may have a negative impact on 
productivity growth in the BS industry: lack of competition, scale disadvantages, and 
shortfalls in internal process innovation. It can hardly be seen why no improvements 
would  be  possible on  these  three causes for  a  poor  productivity  performance.  The 
prime responsibility for this rests with the firms and their industry associations. The 
productivity impact of the key-employee mechanism could be reduced by giving more 
attention to internal trainee programmes, knowledge codification, and other forms of 
knowledge management. Professional and branch associations could play an enabling 
 
12 Leiponen (2003) found evidence that reliance on tacit knowledge held by individual knowledge workers 
(rather than by employee teams) hampers the innovation performance of business services firms. 
13 Cf. Gellatly (1999); Hughes and Wood (1999); Mohnen and Rosa (2000).   15 
role by organising demonstration projects. However, if such initiatives hinge only on 
motivation and information, then why have companies failed to grasp the available 
opportunities?  Some  of  the  aforementioned  solutions  seem  to  be  subject  to  scale 
thresholds:  they  may  simply  fall  beyond  the  reach  of  the  majority  of  small  firms. 
Structural market failures (cf. Table 5) play a role that differs by BS industry branch, 





Table 5  Four types of market failures in business services  
   
Imperfect 
competition. 
Strong  product differentiation  (‘Balkanisation’),  market  segmentation and  monopolistic  competition  are 
prominent market characteristics in branches with knowledge-intensive services. 
   
Information 
asymmetry 
Arises in the market for knowledge-intensive business services due to client uncertainty about product 
quality.  Information asymmetry diminishes market transparency and causes client firms to navigate on 
vested market reputations. This in turn leads to market segmentation and reduced competition intensity. 
   
Externalities  ► Arise in relation to the industry’s role in innovation and knowledge diffusion. Only part of these positive 
impacts on client firms can be seized upon by business services firms. The public good character of the 
transferred knowledge and the risk of imitation (through resigning key employees, or learning-by-looking) 
limit the possibility of asking prices that correspond with the marginal social benefits. Hence, the supply of 
such knowledge services is likely to be lower than socially desirable.  
► The productivity stagnation in business services, and the industry’s own inaptitude to overcome it, can be 
considered as a negative growth externality for the rest of the economy (e.g. European Commission 1997).   
   
Lump-sum 
information costs 
Due to the lump-sum costs of relevant market information small firms in other industries appear to make 
less use of business services than large firms (e.g. European Commission 2003). This may cause those small 
firms to remain operating at efficiency levels lower than they would have otherwise. 
 
POLICY  OPTIONS  FOR  STRENGTHENING  PRODUCTIVITY  AND 
INNOVATION 
 
This section sketches some policy options for tackling the market failures in the BS 
industry. Some options may require new policy instruments, while it may be sufficient 
in other cases simply to refocus existing policies, bringing policy attention for the BS 
industry more in line with this sector’s economic weight and function. 
  A positive impact on BS productivity performance might be expected from 
measures that allow firms to benefit more from scale economies. Figure 6 suggests 
that, given the current small size of the average firm, productivity gains should be 
achievable. Creating incentives for firms to grow beyond the micro-scale, and thus gain 
the  associated  productivity  improvements,  seems  a  gainful  policy  avenue  in  this 
industry. Reducing administrative burdens for expanding firms might be a useful step 
in this regard.  
 
14 The European Commission in its recent Communication on “the competitiveness of business-related 
services and their contribution to the performance of European enterprises” very closely follows the 
analysis adopted here (cf. European Commission 2003). The EU Communication forms kick-off for an 
EU-wide consultation process that is to result in an action plan for this industry in 2005.     16 
  Intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights and brand names play 
only a small role in the BS industry. With a keen eye for the potential competition 
drawbacks of this step, the creation of wider possibilities for intellectual property rights 
on products and innovations could create a basis for more scale advantages in the 
business  services  industry.  Consider,  for  example,  patents  with  short  duration  for 
services products. US experiences with patentability of business methods and software 
could be instructive in this regard.
15 Enhanced possibilities for claiming intellectual 
property rights on innovative services would also stimulate the innovation process in 
services.  Service  firms  are  under-represented  as  participants  in  present  innovation 
policy  schemes.  Stimulation  of  innovation  in  the  BS  industry  might  require  more 
policy attention for non-technological innovations. 
  Market transparency in the BS industry can be improved by removing elements 
of  quality-related  information  asymmetry.  Here  a  system  of  voluntary  quality 
certification might be helpful. Suppose individual service providers or service firms 
can  apply  for  a  government-supported  quality  certificate.  Such  certificates  would 
reduce  quality  uncertainty  for  clients,  making  it  less  risky  for the latter  to  opt for 
certified  small  firms  without  an  established  market  reputation.  Ambitious  and 
innovative small firms would find it easier to compete in market segments that were 
once beyond their reach. The literature on market failure (cf. De Bijl and Van Damme 
1997) suggests that some government involvement in such certification schemes may 
be helpful.
16 Another way to reduce information asymmetry is by introducing standard 
formats or models for certain services. This is a policy avenue which the European 
Commission intends to explore (European Commission 2003). 
  Competitiveness  would  be  enhanced  by  opening  up  domestic  markets  for 
foreign providers. In some branches (like accountancy, tax consultancy, engineering 
and architectural services) foreign competition still plays a negligible role. While the 
Dutch  market  for  business  services  is  relatively  liberalised  compared  to  other  EU 
countries,  many  branch-specific  regulations  still  effectively  block  foreign  market 
access (EU 2002). Widely diverging national market rules among EU countries may 
create prohibitive information costs for medium-sized firms that could otherwise have 
embarked on export activities. Harmonisation of EU market rules in the BS industry, 
and mutual recognition of national quality standards, will lower transaction costs and 




Having an expanding BS industry does not automatically propel the Dutch economy 
and other OECD economies onto the path of the Baumol disease. In order to assess the 
net contribution of the BS industry to macroeconomic productivity growth, we must 
also  account  for  the  industry’s  indirect  productivity  effects. The  latter (innovation, 
knowledge  diffusion)  run  through  client  industries  and  are  mainly  positive. 
 
15 Since 1998, the US Patent Office grants more than 800 patents on business methods, and more than 
20,000 software patents each year. Also Japan has a more permissive stand towards software patents than 
the EU  (OECD 2003a). 
16 Thus preventing a proliferation of parallel quality labels, and a trade in certificates. Government 
involvement, e.g. in co-operation with BS industry associations,  may uphold quality standards and 
facilitate European harmonisation.   17 
Nonetheless, the stagnating productivity growth in the business services industry itself 
is a matter for concern. The most promising policy options tackle the root causes for 
the weak productivity record. Stimulate innovation, increase the transparency of the 
industry’s markets, and elicit more foreign competition: these measures will bolster the 
productivity contributions of business services.    18 
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